Can “Giving Preference to My Patients” be Explained as a Role Related Duty in Public Health Care Systems? by Holm, Søren
ORIGINAL PAPER
Can ‘‘Giving Preference to My Patients’’ be Explained
as a Role Related Duty in Public Health Care Systems?
Søren Holm
Published online: 4 January 2011
  The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to
fairness in health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through
taxation or compulsory insurance. The ﬁrst intuition is that such a system has to
treat patients (and other users) fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without
discrimination. The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care
professionals are allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated to give
preference to the interests of their particular patients or clients over the interests of
other patients or clients of the system. These two intuitions are in potential conﬂict.
One of the most obvious ways in which to ensure impartiality in a health care
system is to require impartiality of all actors in the system, i.e. to give health care
professionals a duty to treat everyone impartially and to deny them the ‘right’ to
give their patients preferential treatment. And one of the possible side-effects of
allowing individual health care professionals to give preference to ‘their clients’ is
to create inequality in health care. This paper explores the conﬂict and proposes that
it can be right to give preference to ‘your’ patients in certain circumstances.
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Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to fairness in
health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through taxation or
compulsory insurance.
1
The ﬁrst intuition is that such a system has to treat patients (and other users)
fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without discrimination. The system
essentially has to live up to a requirement to provide equal service for equal need.
2
The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are
allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated to give preference to the
interests of their particular patients or clients over the interests of other patients or
clients of the system.
3
These two intuitions are in potential conﬂict. One of the most obvious ways
in which to ensure impartiality in a health care system is to require impartiality
of all actors in the system, i.e. to give health care professionals a duty to treat
everyone impartially and to deny them the ‘right’ to give their patients
preferential treatment. And one of the possible side-effects of allowing individual
health care professionals to give preference to ‘their clients’ is to create
inequality in health care.
This potential conﬂict can be further sharpened by the possible claim that health
care professionals have an independent moral obligation to treat everyone
impartially and not to discriminate in favour of anyone. If we parse ‘discriminate’
as ‘giving unjust preference’ then it follows straightforwardly that health care
professionals should not discriminate. But it follows as an analytic truth in the same
way that, for instance murder is always wrong, simply because murder is unjustiﬁed
killing. And it is, as an analytic truth not particularly interesting. It still leaves us
with the task of locating the unjustiﬁable injustice.
If we parse ‘discriminate’ more neutrally as ‘giving preference to’ then it is an
open question whether it is true that health care professionals should never
discriminate and an open question what the class of people is among whom they
should not discriminate.
In the Danish Physicians Oath from 1815 we can for instance ﬁnd the promise
that ‘‘… I will always as conscientiously care for the poor as for the rich without
concern for status…’’ (my translation),
4 but this was not originally taken to imply
that a physician who happened to have a sufﬁcient number of rich patients did
1 We probably have many more intuitions about such health care systems but they are irrelevant for the
topic discussed in this article.
2 We should, however note that it is generally assumed in health care economics and in the priority
setting debate that it is acceptable to trade off equality against effectiveness/efﬁciency.
3 In the following I will use the terms ‘‘health care professional’’ to cover all kinds of health care
professionals and ‘‘patients’’ to cover all those they treat or care for. In certain contexts I will also use the
term ‘‘provider’’ to denote health care professionals who directly interact with and provide care and
treatment to patients. In this paper a ‘‘provider’’ is therefore always a person and not an organisation.
4 ’’…, at jeg stedse vil bære lige samvittighedsfuld omsorg for den fattige som for den rige uden persons
anseelse,…’’ Det Danske Lægeløfte 1815 http://www.laeger.dk/portal/page/portal/LAEGERDK/
LAEGER_DK/LAEGEFAGLIGT/RET_OG_ETIK/ETIK/LAEGELOEFTET.
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his patients. It was only if he treated two of his patients differently because one was
rich and one was poor that he was seen as doing wrong.
Finally, we could parse ‘discriminate’ as ‘showing a preference against’. On this
reading it is again reasonably clear that a health care professional should not show a
preference against any patient in the health care system. But this does not settle the
matter against giving preference to some patients, because it is not obvious that a
health care professional who gives preference to her own patients thereby
necessarily shows a preference against those patients that are not hers. These other
patients may be spatially and temporally distant. Helping the patient that is in front
of me now without thinking about a, to me unknown patient with the same condition
somewhere else is not showing a preference against the, to me unknown patient in
any straightforward way. By reﬂecting on the totality of patients I may of course
come to realise that I or the health care system have obligations towards them all
and may be brought to reﬂect on the content and strength of these obligations, but
that is a different matter.
It is important to note that whereas the core meaning of the verb ‘to prefer’ is
comparative, as in ‘I prefer apples to pears as an afternoon snack’, it is often used
elliptically as in ‘I prefer apples’ where both the comparator and the comparative
context needs further explication. It is only by further explication of the elliptical
statement that we can ascertain whether the person who prefers apples prefer them
to say pineapples and in what context and with what consequences this preference is
likely to be acted upon.
In this paper I will analyse a particular way of dissolving the tension between the
two intuitions mentioned at the beginning. The strategy will be to argue that
whereas the system has to be impartial, just, fair etc. this is best achieved if health
care professionals are given speciﬁc role related permissions to be partial in relation
to their patients.
The reason for pursuing the particular argumentative strategy is that it is to a
considerable extent theory free. If it is successful we can justify provider partiality
without committing to a theoretical account that allows for or justiﬁes partiality at a
more fundamental level, such as an ethics of care, a particular account of agent
relativity or some version of a proximity ethics. This is an advantage because it
allows agreement on the substantive issue of partiality in health care encounter even
among persons with differing theoretical commitments.
Impartiality, Arbitrariness and Discrimination
Before moving on to the constructive part of the argument it is necessary to clear
some conceptual and theoretical ground. It might be argued that the project pursued
here is bound to failure because we have (strong) reasons for requiring impartiality
at the interpersonal level that are unrelated to the goals of the health care system.
Impartiality is simply a foundational principle of ethics (or very close to being one).
This is, for instance exempliﬁed in the consequentialist dictum that ‘‘everybody to
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5 But even strict consequentialists have to
ﬁnd ways to accommodate the intuition that some kinds of partiality are not only
acceptable, but perhaps even preferable. The standard example being the partiality
of parents towards their own children.
6 Consequentialism becomes a much less
attractive theory if such partiality cannot be justiﬁed. The consequentialist solution
to this problem is to assert (without much supporting evidence) that allowing this
particular type of partiality optimises good consequences. As soon as this move is
made the gate is opened for any other kind of partiality that can also plausibly be
claimed to produce net good consequences, including, I submit the partiality of
health care professionals towards their patients.
Kantian universalisation is not of much help to us either in this context since both
the maxim ‘no one should show partiality under any circumstances’ and, for
instance the strong maxim ‘parents should show partiality towards their children’ as
well as the slightly weaker ‘parents are allowed to show partiality towards their
children’ seem to be validly universalisable. And the other famous formulation of
the categorical imperative in terms of treating others as ends in themselves, not
merely as means also seems open to certain forms of partiality.
Andﬁnallyitisgenerallyrecognisedthatpartialityisacceptableincaseswheretwo
parties commit themselves to partiality for instance through an explicit or implicit
contract. In US jurisprudence on the doctor-patient relationship it is, for instance
assumed thatwhena doctor-patientrelationship isestablished the physicianhas toact
as a ﬁduciary for the patient. This is in the context of a non-public health care system,
but is never the less illuminating for the discussion here. According to Furrow the
content of the physician’s obligations can be explicated in the following way:
‘‘A ﬁduciary obligation in medicine means that the physician focuses
exclusively on the patient’s health; the patient assumes the doctor’s single-
minded devotion to him; and the doctor-patient relationship is expected to be
free of conﬂict’’ [3].
7
There are two things it is important to note in relation to this traditional account of
the doctor-patient relationship. The ﬁrst is that any workable morality must allow for
some kind of commitment to partiality (e.g. in many types of promises) and the
second that the possibility of the doctor to credibly commit to a ﬁduciary relationship
may be a precondition for the patient to trust that the doctor is single-minded in his
devotion to the patient’s interest. We worry a great deal about conﬂicts of interest in
medicine and medical research especially in relation to whether the pharmaceutical
industry are seducing health care professionals, but from the point of view of the
patient it may not really matter why I can’t trust that my doctor is devoted to my
interestsorhowhisconﬂictofinteresthasbeencreated.Imaynotcarewhetherheisa
servant of the state or a servant of the capitalists. What matters to me is that I can no
longer rely on him but have to protect my interests myself.
5 This dictum is attributed to Jeremy Bentham by Mill [1]. It does not occur in Bentham’s English
language writings.
6 For an insightful discussion of this issue see Jeske and Fumerton [2].
7 Furrow [3].
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There are many situations where we allow actors in social systems to transgress
prima facie ethical norms in order to achieve the overall goods of the system. We
allow boxers to assault each other in the ring in ways which would be ethically
problematic and in many jurisdictions illegal if done outside of the ring, even with
mutual consent. This is permitted because the activity of boxing is thought to make
possible the achievement of some higher goal, e.g. a certain aesthetic pleasure or a
certain display and development of manly virtues.
8
Perhapsmorerelevantforouranalysisofthecurrentissueisthefactthatwehavein
many countries instituted an adversarial criminal justice system where the prosecutor
andthedefender,bothtrainedlawyershavebeenallocatedrolesthatallowthemnotto
be impartial. The defender is allowed only to emphasise evidence that beneﬁts the
defendant, to use highly questionable techniques for examining witnesses and not to
mention evidence that may jeopardise the case for the defence. Defenders are not
allowedtolieincourt,i.e.tostatesomethingasfactthattheyabsolutelyknownottobe
thefact,buttheyareallowedandinsomesenseexpectedtotrytomisleadthecourtby
stating the facts selectively; and vice versa for the prosecutor.
9
The reason that we have institutionalised such a seemingly strange system is
partly historical, partly because we believe that institutionalising two adversarial
roles is in the ﬁnal analysis conducive to the discovery of the truth and thereby to
the doing of justice.
Role Responsibility in Health Care
Can similar arguments be mounted for provider partiality in health care? Let us ﬁrst
note that we do in general expect health care professionals to pursue the best interest
of their patients. In situations where there are no resource constraints a health care
professional would be negligent if s/he did not provide the best possible treatment
for the patient’s condition. But situations without resource constraint are special
because they only occur when my treatment of one patient does not affect any other
patient in the health care system.
10
But there are also a range of other situation where we expect (or at least allow)
health care professionals to be partial. We expect health care professionals to
engage in debates about priority setting as representatives of their group of patients;
8 Whether it is actually true that boxing does this is outside the scope of this paper, but let us note that if
we did not believe that boxing actualised some good we would have no reason to allow boxing and outlaw
the brawl outside the pub.
9 In his book ‘‘Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life’’ (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999) Arthur I. Applbaum argues in Chapter 5 that the answer to the question
‘Are Lawyers Liars?’ must be ‘Yes’ in adversarial systems on any ordinary understanding of lying.
10 Remember that the time of the health care professional is also a resource so the ‘no resource
constraint’ situation may be fairly rare, but it does occur. If there is only one patient in the waiting room
towards the end of the day and the indicated treatment is removal of earwax there may well be no
resource constraints on this particular interaction. The fact that the system could possibly have
allocated the health care professional’s time more efﬁciently does not alter this.
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treatment decision with priority implications we expect the patient’s health care
professional to present the case in the best possible light and act as an advocate for
the patient. In the latter context we might not allow the degree of partiality we allow
in the legal system, but we do as a matter of fact allow considerable partiality.
The more speciﬁc question we therefore have to answer is what degree of
partiality, if any we can justify as promoting the goals of the health care system.
The question of what the proper goals of the health care system are is itself
contentious. I have elsewhere argued that the goals of the health care system cannot
be reduced to one single goal and will not repeat that argument here.
11 Let us
therefore, for the sake of argument assume that the goals of the health care system
are complex but include:
• Delivering high quality care to the whole population
• Delivering such care effectively
• Delivering such care equitably
• Engendering trust in the system, both with regard to overall performance and
with regard to individual patient-provider interactions
Nothing much in the analysis hinges on whether this stipulation of goals is
accurate or complete, except for the inclusion of other goals than equitable delivery
of care. If the only goal of the health care system is the equitable delivery of care the
following arguments may not be sound.
What is the best way of achieving these goals? What kind of health care system
and what allocation of roles within this system are best suited to achieve the goals?
Stated in this way it is probably an unanswerable question because it is unclear (1)
whether there is a single ‘‘best way’’ and (2) whether we have the epistemic
resources to ﬁnd the answer to the question even if there is one. But it may be
possible to give an answer in broad outline, especially if we assume that at least
some of the features of the current health care system can be held constant and that
we are not beginning with a blank organisational canvas.
The features I will assume as constant are:
1. That the primary responsibility for the care and treatment of a patient is
allocated to one particular health care professional or one particular, relatively
stable team of health care professionals
2. That health care decision making is not and cannot be micro-managed all the
way down, i.e. that guidelines can never be made sufﬁciently speciﬁc to cover
every or even most clinical decisions in detail
Let us move on to discuss whether two kinds of provider partiality can be
acceptable in this context, that is: 1. partiality in relation to advocacy for patient
groups and 2. partiality in relation to treatment of those a health care professional
sees as his or her patients.
Effective advocacy for a patient group arguably requires partiality and as
mentioned above we do as a matter of fact expect or at least allow health care
11 Holm [4].
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relation to the goals of the health care system? Let us ﬁrst note that patient groups
can advocate for their own interests and that we would need a very restrictive
account of what might be called citizen impartiality to justify a claim that such
advocacy is wrong. It is generally assumed that a citizen in a democratic society has
a right to advocate for her own interests and also a right to organise with others to
advocate more successfully. This has the inevitable side-effect that patient groups
that can organise most effectively are also likely to be able to advocate most
effectively for their interests and likely to get their interests better met, unless we
believe against all available evidence that decision makers in democracy can
successfully balance the ‘real’ interests and completely resist the advocacy.
Success organising as a patient group is dependent on a number of factors, but
there are clearly patient groups that will have difﬁculty organising or difﬁculty
organising in sufﬁcient numbers. The sufferers from appendicitis will not organise
because their problem will be solved shortly after it is diagnosed, patients with
severe dementia will not organise because they are unable to and patients with very
rare diseases may only be able to organise trans-nationally if at all simply because
of low numbers.
If that is true it seems compatible with the goals of health care that health care
professionals act at advocates for patient groups that are badly organised, or whose
conditions are not ‘popular’. Such advocacy can in many contexts be directly equity
promoting and will just be justiﬁable even if equity in health care is the only or main
goal of the health care system.
It also seems compatible with the goals of health care to advocate for a patient
group if the quality of care falls below a threshold of acceptable quality. What is
acceptable quality cannot be ﬁxed without reference to the rest of the health care
system, but if a reasonable case can be made that a patient group receives treatment
or care that is of a signiﬁcantly lower quality than that available to other groups in
the system it would be perfectly justiﬁed for a health care professional to advocate
for better care for that particular group and thus to evince partiality in the advocacy.
Let us move to the more contentious case of partiality in relation to the care and
treatment of individuals. As I have already alluded to previously some degree of
partiality may be necessary to engender a successful and maximally effective
patient-professional relationship. It is important for choosing the best and most
effective treatment that patients provide full information to health care professionals
about their symptoms and circumstances, and that they answer questions both
truthfully and (reasonably) exhaustively. But a patient may only feel able to engage
with and disclose fully to a health care professional if he feels that this will not
endanger his interests. If the health care professional is simply ‘an agent of the
health care system’ or a Lipskyan ‘street level bureaucrat’
12 and if patients
accurately perceive this they may engage with the health care professional in
exactly the same way as they engage with other bureaucrats, i.e. they may act
strategically or tactically in order to get their interests promoted.
12 Lipsky [5].
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of the system. Any double agency creates potential conﬂicts of interest, and it is
unclear that the best way to resolve this particular instance of double agency is by
removing the professional’s responsibility to the patient, or by giving the
professional the task of balancing these interests.
This is compatible with the professional working within a set of guidelines, for
instance guidelines specifying the criteria for access to particular treatments. A
professional who was conscientious in making sure that all of her patients who
fulﬁlled the criteria got the treatment and did this without any thoughts concerning
the overall resource use this entailed, or whether her colleagues were equally
conscientious, would show partiality, but arguably in an acceptable way.
In a public health care system it is clear that some body has to take responsibility
for resource allocation but this seems to be a task much better placed at a higher
level of the system than the level of the individual health care professional.
The account of reasonable partiality that has been developed here is denied by
Bærøe in a recent paper in which she claims that all clinicians are always
responsible for:
‘‘a. horizontal equity regarding equal treatment of cases considered equal
within the clinician’s own patient population
b. vertical equity regarding discrimination between the needs of the clinician’s
own patients
c. contributing to vertical equity by unequal treatment of unequal cases within
the whole patient population of a healthcare system
d. contributing to horizontal equity by equal treatment of equal cases within
the whole patient population of a healthcare system’’.
13 (p. 491)
She develops these four obligations from the clinician’s two-fold responsibility
(i.e. to the patients and to the system) and the existence of both horizontal and
vertical equity demands. As it should be obvious from the above I agree with Bærøe
that health care professionals have all of these four obligations, but I disagree
concerning (1) whether the overall aim of equitable health care is best met by
pursuing them all, equally in all health care encounters and (2) the extent to which
always pursuing them all is the right thing to do in a health care system with
multiple goals, only one of which is equity.
Finally, it is perhaps also worth noting that we have little reason to believe that
imposing formal equality all the way down by requiring health care professionals to
act completely impartially will actually lead to actual equality. It might do if we
could micro-manage each and every health care decision. But in the real world we
have reason to expect that well educated, canny and socially resourceful patients are
still likely to get a better deal. How big an improvement, if any in actual equality we
would get by requiring impartiality ‘all the way down’ is an empirical question; but
it is an important question because if we are not able to answer it we do not know
whether our sacriﬁce of a better and probably more effective patient-professional
relationship is repaid by signiﬁcant improvements in equality.
13 Bærøe [6].
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In this paper I have argued that we may have reasons to permit health care
professionals a carefully circumscribed area of partiality in relation to the patients
they come into contact with and properly consider as their patients or clients.
The argument falls in two parts (1) a negative argument in the form of the
rejection of arguments attempting to show that we have strong moral reasons to
require strict impartiality of health care professionals and (2) a positive argument
showing that it is plausible that the goals of the health care system are promoted if
we allow some degree of partiality. However, the argument does not rely on any
particular positive theory of acceptable partiality. The limits to acceptable partiality
are not generated directly by moral theory but by considerations of effective
delivery of high quality and equitable health care to all patients.
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